




















HEALTH AND LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF THE 
ELDERLY IN EUROPE: WHAT DO OBJECTIVE HEALTH 































ISSN 0924-7815 Health and labour force participation of the elderly in
Europe: what do objective health measures add to the
analysis?￿
Adriaan Kalwijyand Frederic Vermeulenz
September, 2006
Abstract
In this paper, we study labour force participation behaviour of individuals aged
50-64 in 11 European countries. The data are drawn from the new Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). We examine the value added of ob-
jective health variables in relation to potentially endogenous self-reported health.
We approach the endogeneity of self-reported health as an omitted variables prob-
lem. In line with the literature on the reliability of self-reported health, ambiguous
results are obtained. In some countries, self-reported health does a fairly good
job: controlling for extra health related variables does not seem to add much to the
analysis. In other countries, however, self-reported health is clearly endogenous with
results that are in line with the justi￿cation hypothesis. They illustrate the multi-
dimensional nature of health and the need to control for objective health variables
when analyzing labour force participation behaviour. This makes an instrumental
variables approach to deal with endogenous self-reported health less appropriate.
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health, retirement.
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Population ageing is considered to be one of the most important social and economic
challenges in Europe in the next decades. Life expectancy has been increasing markedly
since more than a century, while fertility has been declining. At the same time, most
industrialized countries were subject to sweeping changes in their labour markets. Fe-
male labour force participation has increased over time, resulting in a shrinking gap
between male and female participation rates. At the same time, however, workers retire
at younger ages than they used to do. These features imply a big uncertainty concerning
the long term sustainability of public pension programmes in European countries (see
Banks et al., 2002 for a discussion).
It goes without saying that considerable attention has been devoted to these issues
by policy makers and researchers. One basic requirement for a sound analysis of the
ageing problem is, of course, the availability of adequate data sources. In this respect,
many European countries are lagging behind the United States that has a tradition in
gathering data on elderly persons; think, for instance, of the widely explored Retire-
ment History Study (RHS) and its successor the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
Recently, however, Europe partly made up arrears by establishing the Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) covering 11 European countries.1
SHARE contains data on the individual life circumstances of a representative sample
of about 18,000 households with at least one household member aged 50 or over. The
survey covers such issues like labour force participation, a wide range of physical and
mental health indicators, socio-economic situation and family and social networks (see
B￿rsch-Supan et al., 2005 for a sample of the issues covered by SHARE). The ￿rst wave
of SHARE, which is designed as a longitudinal survey, contains data that was gathered
in 2004 and was publicly released in Spring 2005. Given the availability of only one
wave up to now, SHARE will expose its full strength in a couple of years when the next
waves will be available. Nevertheless, its cross-national and its truly multi-disciplinary
dimension, two features which make the dataset unique, are immediately exploitable.
In this study, we take a closer look at the labour force participation of men and
women aged 50-64 (both years included) in Europe and explore which individual and
household characteristics have an impact on individual participation decisions. A va-
riety of variables a⁄ecting individual retirement behaviour have been studied in the
1This paper uses data from the early release 1 of SHARE 2004. This release is preliminary and
may contain errors that will be corrected in later releases. The SHARE data collection has been
primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th framework programme (project QLK6-
CT-2001-00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life). Additional funding came from the US
National Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-
AG-4553-01 and OGHA 04-064). Data collection in Austria (through the Austrian Science Fund, FWF),
Belgium (through the Belgian Science Policy O¢ ce) and Switzerland (through BBW/OFES/UFES) was
nationally funded. The SHARE data set is introduced in B￿rsch-Supan et al. (2005).
2theoretical and empirical literature. As illustrated by Gruber and Wise (1998, 2002,
2005), an important set of such variables relate to incentives inherent in a country￿ s
social security provisions. At this stage, though, SHARE does not allow to calculate
detailed incentive measures such as the accrual in social security wealth by working one
more year or Stock and Wise￿ s (1990) option value of postponing retirement.2
Also the health status is supposed to have an important impact on an elderly in-
dividual￿ s participation decision (see Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999, for a theoretical
discussion of this linkage). Usually, a single health indicator appears in equations de-
scribing labour supply decisions of the elderly (see Rust and Phelan, 1997, Blundell et
al., 2002 and Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005 for only a few examples). A widely used
health indicator in such analyses is self-reported health. It is well-known, however, that
self-reported health may be endogenous. Think, for example, of the justi￿cation hy-
pothesis, where individuals justify their non-participation by claiming that they are in
ill-health (see Bound, 1991). In order to tackle this endogeneity problem, some authors
instrument self-reported health by objective variables related to an individual￿ s health
to obtain a single exogenous health indicator (see Bound et al., 1999, Kerkhofs et al.,
1999, and Disney et al., 2004).
An important aspect when studying the e⁄ects of health status on labour force
participation is that health may be multi-dimensional: di⁄erent health indicators may
have a divergent impact on an individual￿ s participation decision. While a severe health
condition like cancer or a stroke may force an individual to leave the labour market, this
is not necessarily the case for mild conditions such as high blood pressure or diabetes.
The multi-dimensional nature of health makes an instrumental variables approach to
remedy the endogeneity of self-reported health less appropriate. We therefore follow a
di⁄erent road to deal with this endogeneity problem. More speci￿cally, we approach the
endogeneity of self-reported health as an omitted variables problem. At this point, the
multi-disciplinary nature of SHARE turns out to be very useful. The data set not only
contains the standard self-reported health status, but also a wide range of objective
health indicators. Some of the latter, like an individual￿ s grip strength, are commonly
used in the medical sciences but usually not surveyed in the social sciences.
The contribution of our study is twofold. First, we will brie￿ y introduce the new
SHARE data and shed some light on systematic di⁄erences in participation rates and
health across the countries involved. This is not only interesting in its own right, but
also because of SHARE￿ s advantage that the same survey methodology is applied to all
participating countries, which allows easy comparison of the ￿gures. Second, we will
analyse how labour force participation of the elderly is a⁄ected by health related and
2In the future, there will be a link established between SHARE and the social security administration
of some countries, which will allow to calculate detailed pension bene￿ts an individual will be eligible
to when she or he stops working. On its turn this will allow to take into account incentive measures.
(Compare to the link between the HRS and the US Social Security Adminstration).
3socio-demographic characteristics. More in particular, we will examine the value added
of various objective health related variables for elderly individuals￿employment status,
and this in relation to the possibly endogenous self-reported health (see Dwyer and
Mitchell, 1999, for a related exercise on the basis of the HRS). Of course, since SHARE
contains only one wave up to now and the data do not yet allow to calculate detailed
incentive measures, our study is restricted to a static reduced form analysis of some of
the determinants of labour force participation of the elderly in Europe. Nevertheless,
knowing which variables are signi￿cantly associated with labour force participation is a
￿rst important step towards a more advanced analysis on longitudinal data.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the data and descriptive
statistics on labour market behaviour and health of the elderly. Section 3 discusses
our omitted variables approach to deal with the endogeneity of self-reported health and
provides a reduced form analysis of the determinants of labour force participation of
the elderly. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and descriptive statistics
The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a multi-disciplinary
and cross-national dataset that contains information on the individual life circumstances
of, in principle, all eligible members of about 18,000 households. A household is eligible
for participation in SHARE if at least one household member is born in or before 1954.
An individual member of the household is eligible for interview if she or he, or her or his
partner, is born in or before 1954. The SHARE data have been gathered in 2004 and
is a random sample of the target population.3 The resulting SHARE survey contains
information on a wide range of health indicators and socioeconomic variables of over
26,000 individuals. SHARE covers 11 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. The dataset
is designed after the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the English Longitudinal
Study of Ageing (ELSA). Its cross-national dimension makes it a unique and particularly
interesting dataset in comparison to other microdata focusing on the elderly.
In this study, we focus on the labour force participation of men and women aged
50 to 64 (both years included). Although there is an important number of individuals
that are older in the dataset, policies that aim to increase labour force participation of
the elderly probably do not target this group. For example, one of the targets in the
Lisbon Strategy is to have an employment rate of 50 percent for individuals aged 55-64
by 2010 (see European Commission, 2004).
In Table 1, we show some basic statistics on the sample that we selected from
SHARE. After dropping individuals that are younger than 50 (partners of an individual
3The data from Belgium and France were collected in 2004/2005.
4who is 50+) or older than 64 (around 48 percent of the sample), and deleting observa-
tions with important missing information (3 percent of the remaining sample), we retain
a sample of 12,237 observations. Sample size varies considerably across countries (see
Table 1); countries like Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden have around
1500 observations while the other countries, with the exception of Greece, have less than
1000 observations.
The last three columns of Table 1 show the percentages of individuals in three age
classes. These age classes contain about one third of the selected sample, although
there is quite some variation across countries. This variation partly re￿ ects the di⁄erent
age composition in the SHARE countries, but may also be partly due to under- or
overrepresentation of certain age groups.4
Table 1 about here.
As already mentioned in the introduction, SHARE contains a lot of health infor-
mation. In what follows, we focus attention on eight di⁄erent health indicators. These
range from objective measures like an individual￿ s maximum grip strength to the more
subjective health measure indicating whether or not one has a good self-perceived health.
Summary statistics on the health variables are given in Tables 2 and 3. About
14.5 percent of individuals aged 50-64 ever had a severe condition such as a heart
condition, a stroke, cancer or Parkinson. The extremes are covered by Belgium (about
17.5 percent) and Switzerland (9.8 percent). It is di¢ cult to claim that this is due to
the age composition since the Belgian subsample is slightly younger than the Swiss (see
Table 1). More than 60 percent of the sample ever had a mild condition (cholesterol,
diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, etc.; see Smith, 1999, for a classi￿cation). The
extremes are again Belgium (68.0 percent) and Switzerland (45.6 percent). About 38
percent of the individuals in the selected sample su⁄er from restrictions in (instrumental)
activities of daily living ((I)ADLs; walking 100 meter, bathing or showering, dressing,
using the phone, preparing meals, etc.). This is quite high given that we do not focus on
the oldest old in this study. Note the 20 percentage point di⁄erence between Austria and
Switzerland. Part of this di⁄erence can be explained by the relatively older Austrian
subsample. One relatively new health measure in social surveys is the maximum grip
strength (the scale is from 0 to 100). It is recognized that this health variable, which is
known to be correlated with mental as well as physical health, is a very good indicator
of an individual￿ s general health condition (see, for example, Christensen, Mackinnon,
Korten and Jorm, 2001). The di⁄erences in the average across countries is almost 8
points.
4To correct for this one could use sample weights. These are, however, not yet available for the
complete SHARE data.
5Two other health measures are de￿ned by means of the body-mass index (BMI). A
BMI that is between 25 and 30 points out that an individual su⁄ers from overweight.
It turns out that this is the case for about 42 percent of the Europeans aged 50-64. A
BMI that is above 30 indicates obesity, which is the case for 17 percent of the sample.
Taken together, about 60 percent of the elderly in our sample su⁄ers from a weight that
is too high.
Further, about one ￿fth of the individuals aged 50-64 su⁄ers from more than three
bad mental health symptoms like a depression, pessimism, suicidality or guilt. Extremes
are formed by France (30.7 percent) and Germany (15.2 percent). Finally, about 73
percent of the individuals in our selected sample have a good self-perceived physical
health.5
Table 2 about here.
Table 3 about here.
As illustrated in Blanchet, Brugiavini and Rainato (2005), the transition from full
time employment to full time inactivity has become less relevant over the last decades.
The standard pattern to retirement has been supplemented by alternative pathways,
where an individual may be unemployed, pre-retired or on sickness or disability insur-
ance before actually retiring and drawing most resources from pension bene￿ts. Given
the wide variety of systems that persons aged 50 and over can make use of to bridge the
period between regular employment and retirement, it can be argued that it is useful to
focus on labour force participation and lumping together other social states like being
unemployed or on disability insurance. In this study, we consider an individual as par-
ticipating in the labour market if she or he has worked for pay either as an employee or
as a self-employed during the four weeks preceding the interview.
Table 4 shows participation rates for men in the SHARE countries. These partici-
pation rates are given for three di⁄erent age classes. As is clear from the table, there is
quite some variation in labour force participation across age classes and countries. For
example, in the Nordic countries (Denmark and Sweden) and in Switzerland, participa-
tion of men aged 55-64 is relatively high, with levels far above the Lisbon target (across
gender) of 50 percent. In Belgium, participation for the same age group is less than
40 percent. As could be expected, participation is higher for men aged 50-54, although
here too there is considerable variation between the di⁄erent countries. Similar ￿gures
for women are provided by Table 5. Participation of women is lower than that of men
at the country level and for the di⁄erent age groups. The notable exception here are
French women; we have no explanation for this. Roughly speaking, for women the same
5Unlike ELSA, SHARE does not contain biomedical data on health or bio-markers (see Banks and
Kumari, 2005, for an illustration of the usefulness of such variables in retirement studies).
6broad tendencies between countries can be observed as for men. For example, labour
force participation is highest in the Nordic countries and Switzerland, while it is lowest
in Belgium.
Table 4 about here.
Table 5 about here.
Another issue concerns the prevalence of part time work among the elderly in
SHARE. Tables 6 and 7 give the percentages of individuals not participating, work-
ing part time and working full time. An individual is de￿ned to work part time if her or
his average weekly labour supply does not exceed 32 hours. It is clear from the tables
that part time work is more common for women than for men (percentages across all
countries are respectively equal to 19.4 and 8.2 percent). However, there is quite some
variation between countries. While only 2.5 percent of Austrian men between 50 and
64 work part time, this is the case for about 13 percent of Dutch and Greek men. A
similar variation can be observed for elderly women in Europe. In the Netherlands
and Switzerland, more than 30 percent of women aged 50-64 work part time. Also in
Denmark, Germany and Sweden part time working women are quite common, where
percentages are observed of above 20. In the Southern countries (Greece, Italy and
Spain), part time work for elderly women is less common, with percentage rates below
10.
A question that could be rightfully asked is whether individuals decrease the amount
of hours worked if they get older. Therefore, we also calculated the hours choices of men
and women for the three age classes that we used above.6 However, it turns out that
there is no evidence for diminishing working hours with age. Part time work seems to be
more common for Swedish men in the oldest age classes. In the other countries, no clear
pattern is observed. Of course, it should be remarked that convincing evidence with
respect to the above question can only be obtained by longitudinal data were labour
supply transitions of the same individuals are observed.
Table 6 about here.
Table 7 about here.
Several factors may have their in￿ uence on the di⁄erent participation rates across
European countries; these range from a country￿ s particular institutional context, like its
normal retirement age, possibilities for early retirement schemes and how labour income
is taxed when an individual receives a pension, to variables that are individual-speci￿c
6Statistics can be obtained from the authors at request.
7such as an individual￿ s health status or education level. In the next section, we will




We focus on the extensive margin of the labour supply decision. More speci￿cally, we
model the choice between not working and working. Given the data at hand, this is
probably the most relevant dimension to further investigate (see also Section 2). To
describe the individual participation decision, we make use of standard probit regres-
sions. These regressions are separately applied to each of the SHARE countries, and
apart for men and women. This allows us to let the data speak as much as possible for
themselves. Recall that we are forced to leave out incentive measures. Consequently,
we focus on non-￿nancial individual characteristics in a reduced form analysis.
As mentioned in the introduction, self-reported health is widely used as the sole
explanatory variable in participation models. This health measure is subjective in nature
and is potentially endogenous. For example, an individual could justify her or his non-
participation by her or his poor health. Note that such a justi￿cation bias entails an
overestimation of the impact of self-reported health on employment.
In what follows, we will consider the possible endogeneity of self-reported health
as an omitted variables problem. Omitted variables then are objective health related
variables like maximum grip strength or dummies capturing whether or not an indi-
vidual ever had a severe condition that are usually not taken into account in labour
supply analyses. In such a context, two conditions must be satis￿ed to obtain biased
estimates in participation equations that only control for self-reported health. Firstly,
self-reported health and objective health related variables must be correlated. This con-
dition does not pose too many problems since it can be safely argued that self-reported
health is at the least a rough summary of the information provided by an individual￿ s
objective health indicators. Secondly, health must be multi-dimensional in the par-
ticipation equation. More speci￿cally, apart from the impact of self-reported health
on participation, other health measures must have their own in￿ uence on the decision
whether or not to participate. Such a situation can occur if self-reported health also con-
tains information that is not captured by the objective health variables but at the same
time does not summarize all the information that is provided by the latter variables.
If objective health variables are available in addition to self-reported health, a simple
test for the endogeneity of the latter can be conducted. If both self-reported health and
the set of objective health variables are signi￿cant in the participation equation, then
self-reported health is endogenous in standard participation equations that only control
8for the latter. A reduced impact on participation of self-reported health is then consis-
tent with the justi￿cation hypothesis. It must be stressed that if self-reported health
turns insigni￿cant in the participation equation that additionally controls for objective
health variables, then this is no evidence for endogeneity in the current context. Such a
situation would arise, for example, if self-reported health is a su¢ cient statistic for an
individual￿ s general health condition in the sense that objective health variables do not
provide extra information on this. Then self-reported health and (a linear combination
of) objective health variables would act as very close substitutes. In this case, either of
the two (sets of) regressors can be taken up in the participation equation.
We further control for other individual characteristics. A ￿rst set of such regressors
are yearly age dummies. This level of detail allows us to partly capture the countries￿
social security characteristics that are de￿ned in terms of an individual￿ s age (think for
example of the normal retirement age or arrangements for early retirement). The ￿nal
set of regressors that we focus on capture an individual￿ s socio-demographic situation,
like her or his education level, marriage status or number of children.
In what follows, we will ￿rst discuss estimation results obtained for men, to continue
with the same results for women.
3.2. Results for men
Tables 8 and 9 show the estimation results for men aged 50-64. Two speci￿cations are
shown per country: one with only self-reported health included (Speci￿cation 1) and
one with a full set of health related variables (Speci￿cation 2). To ease interpretation,
we give the marginal e⁄ects (along with their standard errors) associated with the
di⁄erent regressors. These are de￿ned as the percentage change of the probability that
an individual works for pay due to a marginal (discrete) increase of the associated
continuous (dummy) variable. Note that most of the regressors are dummy variables.
The only exceptions are the grip strength and the number of children. To compare
their relative importance, we standardized these variables (by subtracting their means
and dividing by their standard deviations). Consequently, their marginal e⁄ects are
associated with the e⁄ect on participation when they increase by one standard deviation.
Let us ￿rst concentrate on Speci￿cation 1. In line with previous studies, self-reported
health is signi￿cantly associated with participation. The percentage point di⁄erence in
the probability to participate when a man claims to have a good health compared to
a similar man who reports a bad health ranges from 15.8 percentage point in Greece
to 34.5 percentage point in Germany. Only in Italy, the marginal e⁄ect is not signif-
icantly di⁄erent from zero. However, as indicated earlier, self-reported health may be
endogenous. Therefore, we added 6 extra health related variables in the regression of
Speci￿cation 2.
We conducted a Wald test to check whether the null hypothesis could be rejected that
9the extra health related variables have no impact on participation once one conditions on
self-reported health. As is clear from Tables 8 and 9, results di⁄er across countries. For
￿ve countries (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden), the test statistic
exceeds the critical value of ￿2
6;0:05 = 12:6. Self-reported health is still signi￿cant after
taking into account objective health related variables in Denmark, the Netherlands and
Sweden. Moreover, the marginal e⁄ect of self-reported health considerably decreases
once one takes into account other health indicators. These results are consistent with the
justi￿cation hypothesis and indicate that self-reported health is indeed endogenous: not
conditioning on the extra, objective, health related variables, obtains a biased estimate
of the impact of self-reported health on participation (and possibly of the impact of
other variables if the latter are not independent from self-reported health; see further).
Although the null hypothesis that objective health indicators have no impact on par-
ticipation is rejected for Austria and Spain, the endogeneity of self-reported health seems
less an issue. The initially signi￿cant and economically rather important self-reported
health turns insigni￿cant and economically less important when one also conditions on
the full set of health related variables. In these countries, self-reported health thus seems
to be strongly correlated with a linear combination of the other health variables, which
makes the sole conditioning on self-reported health not a too big issue here. Note that
in Austria, no less than three other health variables seem associated with self-reported
health (the experience of a severe health condition, the grip strength and having a bad
mental health).
Also for the other six countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and
Switzerland) endogeneity of self-reported health seems less of a problem: a Wald test
cannot reject the joint insigni￿cance of the objective health variables. A similar re-
sult has been found by Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) on the basis of the HRS. Following
Ben￿tez-Silva et al. (2004), this result could be explained by the fact that self-reported
health summarizes, among others, a lot of unobserved health related information that
cannot be captured by more objective health variables.
Let us now discuss the marginal e⁄ects of the other health variables. Having expe-
rienced a severe health condition implies a statistically signi￿cant lower probability to
participate in only three of the SHARE countries (Austria, Denmark and Spain). The
economic impact of a severe condition varies in a quite important way between these
countries. In Denmark, the probability of participation is 14.6 percentage point lower
for a man who experienced a severe condition compared to an individual who never had
a severe condition and who is in all other aspects equal. In Austria, the similar percent-
age point decrease in participation amounts to more than 26. Note that this relatively
large di⁄erence may be due to the particular composition of the countries￿subsamples
that are characterized by a severe condition. As could be expected, the impact of a mild
condition is less important: its marginal e⁄ect is insigni￿cant in all eleven countries.
Having restrictions in (instrumental) activities of daily living, on the other hand, has
10a signi￿cant and economically important impact in Spain and Sweden, with marginal
e⁄ects between -13.9 and -25.4. Obesity, on its turn, has nowhere a signi￿cant marginal
e⁄ect. A new health indicator in social surveys is the maximum grip strength of an
individual. As is clear from the results, the indicator is quite important in ￿ve countries
in the analysis (Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden). All else
equal, the higher an individual￿ s grip strength, the more he is likely to participate to
the labour market. In Austria, for example, an increase of one standard deviation in
grip strength, implies a higher probability of working of about 10 percentage point. For
Swedish men, the impact is economically less important, with a marginal e⁄ect of about
3 percentage point.
The above results demonstrate that health is multi-dimensional in six countries,
which concurs with earlier ￿ndings by, for example, Dwyer and Mitchell (1999). Di⁄erent
health indicators have divergent and signi￿cant marginal e⁄ects in Austria, Denmark,
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. In addition to mitigating the endogeneity
problem associated with self-reported health, taking into account a broader set of health
related variables allows to draw a more re￿ned picture of how employment and health
are associated in these countries.
Let us now focus attention on the other regressors in the analysis, starting with
the age dummies. Although the normal retirement ages are at least 65 in the SHARE
countries, it is clear from the tables that many age dummies are signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from zero, while they generally increase in importance for older individuals.7 This is
likely due to the existence of age speci￿c early retirement and disability schemes in most
countries. The probit results show that the age dummies do not start having any impact
before the age of 56: the associated marginal e⁄ects are small in absolute value and not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for all countries. A signi￿cant age e⁄ect can be observed
as soon as an individual is 56 in Austria, Belgium and Italy. Especially in Austria, this
e⁄ect is rather important: the probability that an Austrian man of age 56 participates is
45 (39) percentage point lower than the participation probability of a similar 50 year old
man in Speci￿cation 1 (2). In countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, there
is only a signi￿cant impact of the age dummies associated with ages that are at least
equal to 60. A remarkable result is obtained for Sweden and Switzerland. Although the
marginal e⁄ects get smaller for older ages, none of these is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero in Speci￿cation 2. This implies that, everything else constant, age does not seem
to be associated with employment before an individual reaches the normal retirement
age in Sweden and Switzerland.
A ￿nal set of estimates refer to an individual￿ s socio-demographic characteristics.
The estimation results indicate that education plays a rather important role in the
7Not all age dummies could be taken into account for France and Switzerland, the reason being that
some of these were perfectly correlated with participation/non participation. Problematic age dummies,
together with the associated observations, were dropped.
11participation decision in most countries. All else equal, the higher the level of education,
the higher the probability of participation. Remarkably, in Greece, Spain, Sweden and
Switzerland, education does not seem to be associated with participation in a signi￿cant
way.8 The impact of a household￿ s demographic composition is not extremely important.
Although, ceteris paribus, more children imply a higher probability of participation, this
is only signi￿cantly estimated in Austria, Belgium, France and Sweden. Finally, only in
the Nordic countries (Denmark and Sweden), the parameter associated with the dummy
variable that captures whether or not a man lives in a couple is signi￿cantly estimated
in both speci￿cations. All else equal, Danish (Swedish) men who live in a couple have a
participation probability that is 18 (12) percentage point higher than that of men who
are single.
Worthy of note is that although self-reported health is likely endogenous in a number
of countries, the impact on the marginal e⁄ects of the regressors that are not health
related is relatively small. Di⁄erences in statistical and economic signi￿cance of the
marginal e⁄ects in both speci￿cations are far from substantial. This seems to indicate
that the set of health related variables and the other regressors are close to independent
from each other. The endogeneity problem is thus less important as far as the impact
on participation of socio-demographic characteristics is concerned. Of course, there is
no guarantee that this conclusion can be transferred to economic variables. Answering
this question will be possible in the future when a link is established between SHARE
and detailed social security data (see above).
Table 8 about here.
Table 9 about here.
3.3. Results for women
Marginal e⁄ects and standard errors associated with the probit regression results for
women aged 50-64 are shown in Tables 10 and 11.9 We again consider two speci￿ca-
tions. Speci￿cation 1 only takes into account self-reported health, while Speci￿cation
2 conditions on a full set of objective and subjective health indicators. Given that the
results for women are qualitatively similar to those obtained for males, we will keep the
discussion that follows concise.
Self-reported health is likely to be endogenous in Belgium and Sweden. A Wald
test strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the parameters associated with the extra
8This is also formally con￿rmed by means of a Wald test associated with the null hypothesis that
both education dummies do not have any joint impact on participation.
9The age dummy associated with the age of 64 could not be taken into account for Belgium, since it
is perfectly correlated with non participation. This problematic variable, together with the associated
observations, were dropped.
12health related variables are jointly insigni￿cant once one conditions on self-reported
health, while the latter remains signi￿cant in Speci￿cation 2. Moreover, taking into
account the full set of health related variables has a negative impact on the marginal
e⁄ect of self-reported health, which is consistent with the justi￿cation hypothesis.
An initially signi￿cant marginal e⁄ect associated with self-reported health in Speci￿-
cation 1 turns insigni￿cant in Speci￿cation 2 for Denmark, France and the Netherlands.
This demonstrates that for these countries, self-reported health is strongly correlated
with the other health related variables. In some countries, self-reported health does a
fairly good job: it is the only signi￿cant health related variable in the female partici-
pation equations for Austria, Germany and Greece. No additional information is thus
provided by objective health indicators on top of an individual￿ s self-reported health.
A number of health indicators have their own signi￿cant marginal e⁄ects. There is
quite an important variation between countries though. While only one health variable
has a signi￿cant marginal e⁄ect in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece and Switzerland,
in countries like Sweden and France, respectively four and three health indicators have
an own signi￿cant marginal e⁄ect. The marginal e⁄ects of the individual health variables
are generally comparable to those obtained for men.
Similar to the men￿ s results, many age dummies have signi￿cant marginal e⁄ects.
However, these e⁄ects start earlier. In Belgium, for example, women who are 54 years
old are about 20 percentage point less likely to work compared to a 50 years old woman.
In Germany and the Netherlands, age comes into play as soon as a woman reaches the
age of 60 (as was also the case for German and Dutch men). For Swedish women, the
age e⁄ect gets signi￿cant for women who are 64. Contrary to the estimation results for
men (for Speci￿cation 2), there are no countries that are characterized by absence of
any age e⁄ects.
The impact of education is both economically and statistically signi￿cant for all
countries: higher education implies a, ceteris paribus, higher probability of working for
pay.10 The lowest impact is observed in Sweden, where highly educated women are 10
percentage point more likely to participate than low educated women, all else equal.
In Italy, highly educated women have a probability of participation that is even 46
percentage point higher than otherwise similar low educated women.
Other striking di⁄erences can be observed for the regressors that are related to a
household￿ s demographic composition. All else equal, in many countries women have
a lower probability to participate if they live in a couple (up to about 23.5 percentage
point in France and Spain) and/or if there are children present in the household. Given
the positive impact of the dummy variable associated with living in a couple and the
number of children in many of the men￿ s equations, this could indicate that there is some
10Although both dummies associated with education are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero for
France, the null hypothesis of their joint insigni￿cance is rejected at the 5 percent signi￿cance level.
13coordination going on within couples: on average men seem to specialize in market work
while women stay home and take care for the children.
Following the men￿ s results, it must be stressed that the impact of the endogeneity
problem on the other regressors is not very dramatic. Marginal e⁄ects associated with
the latter do not di⁄er much across the two speci￿cations; this both in terms of statistical
and economic signi￿cance.
Table 10 about here.
Table 11 about here.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied labour force participation behaviour of elderly individuals in
Europe. The data used were drawn from the ￿rst wave of the new Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). This survey, which is designed as a lon-
gitudinal survey, contains detailed data on the life circumstances of a representative
sample of individuals aged 50 and over in 11 European countries. Its cross-national
and multi-disciplinary nature makes it a very valuable source for all kinds of social and
economic analyses.
We had two objectives in mind. A ￿rst objective was to introduce the new SHARE
data and describe participation and health patterns for the countries involved. The
common methodology applied to each of the countries allows an easy comparison of the
￿gures discussed. As has been illustrated, di⁄erences in participation rates and health
are quite substantial across the SHARE countries.
Secondly, we examined the value added of objective health variables, in addition to
the potentially endogenous self-reported health status, in studies focusing on participa-
tion of the elderly. Contrary to earlier studies, we approach the possible endogeneity
of self-reported health as an omitted variables problem. The exercise turns out to be a
perfect illustration of the ￿empirical mine￿eld￿ , which Ben￿tez-Silva et al. (2004) use
to describe the empirical literature on the reliability of self-reported health, with its
far from unambiguous results. In some countries, the subjective health measure does a
fairly good job: controlling for extra health related variables does not seem to add to
the analysis and implies an exogenous self-reported health (at least within our partici-
pation model, in which we could not control for economic variables like the accrual in
social security wealth that is not available yet in SHARE). In other countries, however,
self-reported health is clearly endogenous with results that are in line with the justi-
￿cation hypothesis. They also illustrate the multi-dimensional nature of health. As a
consequence, simply instrumenting self-reported health by a set of objective measures
may be a too rough remedy in employment studies. But even in this case, marginal
14e⁄ects of the other socio-demographic regressors in the analysis seem not very much
a⁄ected by the endogeneity problem associated with self-reported health. Of course, it
is a bridge too far to transfer this conclusion to the impact of economic variables on
participation of the elderly; an issue that we could not investigate yet.
When taking these results together, they suggest that the objective health variables
are likely to be of empirical importance to mitigate the potential endogeneity of subjec-
tive health and account for the multi-dimensional nature of health in the participation
decision.
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16Country Observations Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64
Austria 882 27.21 32.43 40.36
Belgium 1511 38.19 36.00 25.81
Denmark 866 35.22 34.76 30.02
France 785 38.73 36.31 24.97
Germany 1450 35.24 28.69 36.09
Greece 1098 42.08 31.24 26.68
Italy 1205 25.06 37.34 37.59
The Netherlands 1544 32.71 37.37 29.92
Spain 971 33.88 34.09 32.03
Sweden 1464 30.12 37.09 32.79
Switzerland 461 38.83 30.37 30.80
Total 12,307 33.95 34.45 31.59
Table 1: Sample statistics and age classes
Note: Entries for age classes are in percent.
Country Severe condition Mild condition (I)ADLs Max. grip strength
Austria 12.02 56.69 44.22 39.26
Belgium 17.54 67.97 41.56 38.82
Denmark 17.21 62.36 31.99 40.29
France 14.14 62.29 34.27 37.26
Germany 14.76 59.59 40.41 39.97
Greece 9.93 55.28 41.44 36.99
Italy 14.19 65.98 41.08 34.23
The Netherlands 17.42 54.99 35.23 39.13
Spain 12.98 67.04 43.98 32.28
Sweden 14.62 60.52 32.59 38.41
Switzerland 9.76 45.55 24.51 39.00
Total 14.54 60.62 38.09 37.85
Table 2: Health indicators. Part 1
Note: Occurrence of conditions and (I)ADLs in percent; maximum grip strength in kg.Country Overweight Obese Bad mental health Good self-perceived health
Austria 42.29 21.54 15.76 73.81
Belgium 41.03 19.39 21.91 75.65
Denmark 40.18 13.97 16.51 76.44
France 37.32 15.54 30.70 75.80
Germany 45.03 15.52 15.17 67.10
Greece 48.36 19.95 19.58 78.78
Italy 43.82 17.93 29.63 62.16
The Netherlands 42.68 14.90 17.49 76.49
Spain 45.21 23.79 27.39 65.09
Sweden 40.92 14.34 16.73 71.58
Switzerland 33.19 12.80 17.57 86.12
Total 42.46 17.29 20.50 72.70
Table 3: Health indicators. Part 2
Note: Entries are in percent.
Country Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64
Austria 82.35 65.35 16.77
Belgium 79.72 51.10 18.99
Denmark 84.05 78.26 56.49
France 87.66 60.87 7.87
Germany 83.04 77.04 39.37
Greece 92.42 77.96 44.97
Italy 85.34 56.28 29.21
The Netherlands 87.00 78.13 29.57
Spain 85.37 77.30 40.54
Sweden 93.85 82.86 67.83
Switzerland 93.75 92.65 72.00
Total 86.33 71.18 38.20
Table 4: Labour force participation men
Note: Entries are in percent.Country Age 50-54 Age 55-59 Age 60-64
Austria 67.77 38.36 11.28
Belgium 59.79 30.15 7.58
Denmark 85.92 73.62 29.46
France 68.67 58.82 16.82
Germany 78.05 60.91 23.05
Greece 40.64 28.66 15.28
Italy 47.31 28.29 7.97
The Netherlands 61.70 49.53 17.24
Spain 47.57 40.53 19.02
Sweden 84.96 79.87 62.40
Switzerland 79.80 69.44 47.76
Total 64.35 50.00 22.65
Table 5: Labour force participation women
Note: Entries are in percent.
Country Nonparticipation Half time Full time
Austria 49.9 2.5 47.7
Belgium 46.4 7.5 46.1
Denmark 27.1 7.2 65.7
France 41.6 4.8 53.6
Germany 35.8 4.8 59.5
Greece 32.6 13.4 54.0
Italy 48.7 9.5 41.8
The Netherlands 35.1 12.8 52.1
Spain 35.4 7.3 57.3
Sweden 19.3 8.5 72.2
Switzerland 17.9 9.9 72.2
Total 36.0 8.2 55.8
Table 6: Labour supply choice men
Note: Entries are in percent.Country Nonparticipation Half time Full time
Austria 65.3 14.1 20.6
Belgium 65.9 19.4 14.7
Denmark 35.9 21.2 42.9
France 48.7 15.5 35.8
Germany 46.3 26.2 27.6
Greece 73.0 9.1 17.9
Italy 75.9 9.7 14.4
The Netherlands 55.6 31.0 13.4
Spain 64.4 9.8 25.8
Sweden 24.6 23.2 52.3
Switzerland 35.7 31.5 32.8
Total 54.5 19.4 26.1
Table 7: Labour supply choice women
Note: Entries are in percent.Austria Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2
Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err.
Age dummies
Age51 -0.130 (0.210) -0.240 (0.221) 0.004 (0.110) -0.012 (0.110) -0.048 (0.130) -0.012 (0.121) 0.217 (0.166) 0.220 (0.176) -0.173 (0.197) -0.199 (0.190) -0.033 (0.137) -0.030 (0.135)
Age52 0.096 (0.230) -0.064 (0.268) -0.054 (0.107) -0.061 (0.106) 0.010 (0.129) 0.044 (0.120) 0.075 (0.164) 0.105 (0.160) -0.172 (0.191) -0.208 (0.182) 0.041 (0.119) 0.035 (0.119)
Age53 -0.046 (0.217) -0.176 (0.244) 0.010 (0.107) 0.011 (0.106) -0.206 (0.150) -0.161 (0.149) -0.204 (0.190) -0.193 (0.197) -0.234 (0.190) -0.236 (0.183) -0.051 (0.144) -0.056 (0.145)
Age54 -0.213 (0.188) -0.304 (0.191) 0.011 (0.105) 0.018 (0.105) -0.110 (0.135) -0.084 (0.130) 0.082 (0.168) 0.165 (0.150) -0.024 (0.179) -0.025 (0.171) -0.221 (0.162) -0.223 (0.163)
Age55 -0.034 (0.205) -0.169 (0.224) -0.083 (0.103) -0.081 (0.103) -0.048 (0.125) -0.039 (0.123) -0.288 (0.175) -0.252 (0.189) -0.019 (0.188) -0.019 (0.181) -0.111 (0.153) -0.106 (0.149)
Age56 -0.386 (0.131) -0.454 (0.113) -0.280 (0.089) -0.276 (0.090) 0.037 (0.110) 0.088 (0.092) -0.297 (0.184) -0.268 (0.194) -0.124 (0.201) -0.144 (0.195) -0.186 (0.164) -0.203 (0.165)
Age57 -0.247 (0.186) -0.349 (0.173) -0.327 (0.087) -0.303 (0.092) -0.183 (0.153) -0.151 (0.147) -0.371 (0.165) -0.324 (0.181) -0.223 (0.194) -0.216 (0.188) -0.287 (0.158) -0.279 (0.158)
Age58 -0.241 (0.176) -0.287 (0.188) -0.386 (0.075) -0.359 (0.081) -0.113 (0.154) -0.072 (0.146) -0.388 (0.159) -0.349 (0.173) -0.301 (0.188) -0.301 (0.181) -0.303 (0.156) -0.302 (0.157)
Age59 -0.357 (0.140) -0.391 (0.146) -0.480 (0.058) -0.466 (0.062) -0.138 (0.161) -0.088 (0.156) -0.460 (0.153) -0.425 (0.172) -0.329 (0.190) -0.304 (0.188) -0.489 (0.145) -0.486 (0.145)
Age60 -0.463 (0.093) -0.486 (0.098) -0.519 (0.047) -0.501 (0.053) -0.101 (0.142) -0.028 (0.129) -0.671 (0.042) -0.662 (0.049) -0.419 (0.165) -0.424 (0.160) -0.476 (0.149) -0.487 (0.149)
Age61 -0.571 (0.042) -0.585 (0.043) -0.508 (0.049) -0.503 (0.051) -0.277 (0.149) -0.216 (0.152) -0.684 (0.047) -0.675 (0.054) -0.613 (0.103) -0.617 (0.099) -0.477 (0.151) -0.499 (0.147)
Age62 -0.577 (0.050) -0.601 (0.048) -0.522 (0.048) -0.511 (0.052) -0.383 (0.149) -0.317 (0.156) -0.699 (0.052) -0.687 (0.061) -0.554 (0.124) -0.535 (0.129) -0.667 (0.101) -0.670 (0.102)
Age63 -0.585 (0.043) -0.599 (0.044) -0.545 (0.038) -0.533 (0.045) -0.547 (0.142) -0.512 (0.151) -0.551 (0.128) -0.556 (0.122) -0.612 (0.127) -0.622 (0.125)
Age64 -0.572 (0.041) -0.588 (0.041) -0.540 (0.039) -0.532 (0.043) -0.635 (0.107) -0.581 (0.131) -0.668 (0.048) -0.663 (0.054) -0.626 (0.096) -0.613 (0.101) -0.760 (0.066) -0.763 (0.066)
Demographic variables
Secondary education 0.012 (0.097) 0.013 (0.093) 0.056 (0.051) 0.050 (0.051) 0.070 (0.063) 0.078 (0.068) 0.171 (0.071) 0.187 (0.071) 0.144 (0.099) 0.144 (0.105) -0.016 (0.046) -0.019 (0.046)
Higher education 0.251 (0.099) 0.238 (0.097) 0.163 (0.047) 0.172 (0.048) 0.149 (0.057) 0.159 (0.059) 0.339 (0.063) 0.351 (0.063) 0.257 (0.088) 0.252 (0.093) -0.016 (0.047) -0.020 (0.047)
Children 0.064 (0.030) 0.081 (0.033) 0.061 (0.026) 0.058 (0.027) 0.057 (0.036) 0.049 (0.037) 0.087 (0.032) 0.094 (0.034) 0.032 (0.025) 0.027 (0.025) -0.004 (0.018) -0.003 (0.018)
Couple 0.181 (0.078) 0.126 (0.081) 0.102 (0.064) 0.095 (0.065) 0.179 (0.063) 0.180 (0.065) 0.075 (0.093) 0.063 (0.094) -0.009 (0.058) -0.015 (0.059) -0.068 (0.052) -0.074 (0.051)
Health related variables
Self-reported health 0.246 (0.063) 0.076 (0.082) 0.185 (0.050) 0.119 (0.058) 0.309 (0.059) 0.236 (0.074) 0.186 (0.082) 0.072 (0.096) 0.345 (0.043) 0.281 (0.055) 0.158 (0.060) 0.166 (0.070)
Severe condition -0.263 (0.089) -0.105 (0.058) -0.146 (0.071) -0.141 (0.105) -0.029 (0.059) 0.023 (0.058)
Mild condition -0.011 (0.068) -0.033 (0.046) 0.070 (0.047) 0.062 (0.068) -0.001 (0.047) 0.049 (0.040)
(I)ADL -0.096 (0.073) -0.048 (0.048) -0.040 (0.062) -0.103 (0.089) -0.041 (0.047) -0.003 (0.042)
Obese 0.028 (0.075) 0.044 (0.053) 0.085 (0.054) -0.058 (0.092) -0.085 (0.061) 0.015 (0.047)
Grip strength 0.098 (0.033) 0.042 (0.022) 0.058 (0.024) 0.005 (0.035) 0.053 (0.023) 0.020 (0.020)
Bad mental health -0.293 (0.085) 0.013 (0.060) -0.066 (0.077) -0.172 (0.089) -0.068 (0.074) -0.058 (0.070)
Wald test statistic 24.0 9.5 16.9 10.5 10.6 3.4
Observations 407 407 737 737 432 432 346 346 674 674 546 546
Pseudo R squared 0.368 0.416 0.246 0.255 0.212 0.245 0.407 0.424 0.261 0.276 0.236 0.242
Table 8: Marginal effects men. Part 1
Note: Bold entries are significant at the five percent significance level
Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden Switzerland
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2
Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err.
Age dummies
Age51 0.063 (0.217) 0.029 (0.215) -0.004 (0.122) -0.018 (0.128) 0.184 (0.111) 0.228 (0.086) -0.088 (0.168) -0.033 (0.149) -0.021 (0.125) -0.043 (0.147)
Age52 -0.196 (0.185) -0.237 (0.172) 0.104 (0.106) 0.091 (0.112) 0.037 (0.145) 0.057 (0.147) -0.037 (0.160) 0.006 (0.140) -0.062 (0.179) -0.071 (0.192)
Age53 -0.009 (0.222) -0.058 (0.218) 0.035 (0.123) 0.056 (0.120) 0.142 (0.118) 0.130 (0.125) 0.025 (0.120) 0.072 (0.088)
Age54 -0.115 (0.189) -0.140 (0.181) 0.051 (0.109) 0.062 (0.108) 0.067 (0.141) 0.099 (0.127) -0.034 (0.147) -0.011 (0.140)
Age55 -0.207 (0.177) -0.239 (0.165) -0.019 (0.135) -0.023 (0.138) 0.133 (0.126) 0.147 (0.128) -0.027 (0.146) 0.032 (0.114) -0.023 (0.143) -0.007 (0.124)
Age56 -0.328 (0.143) -0.362 (0.129) -0.044 (0.121) -0.054 (0.124) -0.127 (0.178) -0.073 (0.179) -0.179 (0.185) -0.124 (0.183) -0.024 (0.173) -0.056 (0.200)
Age57 -0.319 (0.146) -0.363 (0.128) -0.056 (0.122) -0.037 (0.124) -0.111 (0.171) -0.104 (0.178) -0.180 (0.188) -0.100 (0.171) -0.019 (0.150) -0.010 (0.139)
Age58 -0.423 (0.117) -0.456 (0.101) -0.150 (0.124) -0.144 (0.128) 0.052 (0.134) 0.096 (0.129) -0.211 (0.182) -0.144 (0.177) 0.049 (0.103) 0.043 (0.102)
Age59 -0.524 (0.068) -0.542 (0.058) -0.216 (0.137) -0.236 (0.142) -0.037 (0.152) 0.024 (0.145) -0.248 (0.203) -0.154 (0.193)
Age60 -0.531 (0.067) -0.552 (0.055) -0.459 (0.110) -0.468 (0.111) -0.458 (0.141) -0.372 (0.172) -0.344 (0.201) -0.251 (0.205) -0.120 (0.171) -0.195 (0.204)
Age61 -0.491 (0.084) -0.510 (0.074) -0.451 (0.108) -0.450 (0.114) -0.422 (0.151) -0.357 (0.176) -0.318 (0.203) -0.251 (0.210) -0.239 (0.205) -0.205 (0.208)
Age62 -0.542 (0.066) -0.562 (0.057) -0.556 (0.090) -0.559 (0.092) -0.210 (0.164) -0.159 (0.175) -0.301 (0.206) -0.217 (0.206) -0.211 (0.200) -0.261 (0.231)
Age63 -0.573 (0.042) -0.589 (0.035) -0.688 (0.050) -0.694 (0.050) -0.351 (0.160) -0.286 (0.183) -0.445 (0.212) -0.333 (0.231) -0.402 (0.228) -0.441 (0.251)
Age64 -0.494 (0.089) -0.523 (0.074) -0.651 (0.058) -0.641 (0.068) -0.427 (0.148) -0.371 (0.169) -0.461 (0.203) -0.361 (0.224) -0.461 (0.247) -0.462 (0.282)
Demographic variables
Secondary education 0.170 (0.054) 0.164 (0.056) 0.103 (0.044) 0.085 (0.045) 0.032 (0.070) 0.023 (0.069) -0.005 (0.038) -0.010 (0.039) 0.055 (0.057) 0.028 (0.057)
Higher education 0.287 (0.064) 0.277 (0.066) 0.111 (0.046) 0.116 (0.046) 0.077 (0.067) 0.051 (0.075) 0.039 (0.031) 0.022 (0.031) 0.087 (0.053) 0.049 (0.052)
Children 0.024 (0.025) 0.030 (0.025) 0.037 (0.021) 0.039 (0.021) 0.014 (0.022) 0.011 (0.022) 0.048 (0.022) 0.045 (0.021) 0.014 (0.026) 0.010 (0.025)
Couple 0.099 (0.084) 0.099 (0.085) 0.097 (0.070) 0.053 (0.069) 0.072 (0.078) 0.078 (0.078) 0.122 (0.048) 0.115 (0.049) -0.030 (0.059) -0.009 (0.057)
Health related variables
Self-reported health 0.058 (0.053) 0.052 (0.060) 0.341 (0.053) 0.301 (0.063) 0.206 (0.056) 0.025 (0.067) 0.190 (0.041) 0.117 (0.041) 0.334 (0.110) 0.283 (0.136)
Severe condition -0.049 (0.077) 0.025 (0.052) -0.242 (0.087) -0.029 (0.038) -0.003 (0.077)
Mild condition -0.007 (0.052) 0.000 (0.043) 0.017 (0.056) 0.012 (0.029) -0.005 (0.050)
(I)ADL 0.025 (0.057) 0.017 (0.050) -0.254 (0.065) -0.139 (0.042) 0.049 (0.060)
Obese -0.128 (0.065) -0.033 (0.064) -0.047 (0.067) -0.020 (0.039) -0.038 (0.074)
Grip strength -0.015 (0.027) 0.052 (0.021) 0.013 (0.027) 0.032 (0.015) 0.042 (0.029)
Bad mental health -0.017 (0.066) -0.199 (0.069) -0.006 (0.077) -0.026 (0.050) -0.262 (0.139)
Wald test statistic 5.1 17.0 33.3 25.2 6.7
Observations 517 517 709 709 412 412 670 670 181 181
Pseudo R squared 0.217 0.225 0.320 0.338 0.198 0.263 0.167 0.202 0.189 0.233
Table 9: Marginal effects men. Part 2
Note: Bold entries are significant at the five percent significance levelAustria Belgium Denmark France Germany Greece
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2
Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err.
Age dummies
Age51 0.006 (0.136) 0.012 (0.138) -0.032 (0.083) -0.023 (0.088) 0.027 (0.149) 0.058 (0.143) 0.103 (0.131) 0.072 (0.135) 0.079 (0.109) 0.079 (0.109) -0.081 (0.077) -0.073 (0.079)
Age52 -0.051 (0.117) -0.048 (0.116) 0.030 (0.094) 0.026 (0.097) -0.191 (0.185) -0.146 (0.194) -0.056 (0.142) -0.127 (0.136) 0.152 (0.109) 0.148 (0.110) 0.075 (0.098) 0.092 (0.101)
Age53 -0.151 (0.088) -0.153 (0.088) -0.135 (0.075) -0.132 (0.075) -0.083 (0.160) -0.023 (0.162) -0.098 (0.124) -0.158 (0.118) 0.181 (0.102) 0.183 (0.102) 0.050 (0.096) 0.070 (0.101)
Age54 0.057 (0.152) 0.061 (0.156) -0.201 (0.057) -0.192 (0.060) 0.173 (0.115) 0.191 (0.102) -0.048 (0.143) -0.027 (0.149) 0.159 (0.104) 0.157 (0.104) -0.113 (0.068) -0.108 (0.070)
Age55 -0.219 (0.065) -0.215 (0.066) -0.221 (0.055) -0.206 (0.059) -0.003 (0.165) 0.017 (0.169) 0.040 (0.136) 0.003 (0.135) 0.102 (0.111) 0.118 (0.108) -0.209 (0.054) -0.205 (0.055)
Age56 -0.071 (0.108) -0.054 (0.113) -0.241 (0.051) -0.215 (0.058) 0.014 (0.149) 0.041 (0.151) -0.155 (0.125) -0.192 (0.124) -0.115 (0.115) -0.123 (0.114) -0.136 (0.074) -0.132 (0.074)
Age57 -0.256 (0.054) -0.251 (0.056) -0.329 (0.033) -0.313 (0.037) -0.104 (0.173) -0.017 (0.170) -0.125 (0.123) -0.195 (0.118) -0.119 (0.119) -0.104 (0.120) 0.015 (0.112) 0.033 (0.118)
Age58 -0.249 (0.057) -0.235 (0.063) -0.309 (0.037) -0.295 (0.041) -0.261 (0.173) -0.199 (0.191) -0.290 (0.100) -0.328 (0.093) -0.124 (0.121) -0.123 (0.122) 0.018 (0.100) 0.037 (0.104)
Age59 -0.305 (0.036) -0.302 (0.038) -0.279 (0.043) -0.255 (0.051) -0.370 (0.152) -0.346 (0.172) -0.314 (0.109) -0.330 (0.103) -0.107 (0.124) -0.113 (0.124) -0.121 (0.094) -0.114 (0.097)
Age60 -0.340 (0.034) -0.339 (0.035) -0.363 (0.024) -0.354 (0.025) -0.432 (0.148) -0.397 (0.173) -0.404 (0.086) -0.442 (0.067) -0.331 (0.092) -0.322 (0.094) -0.191 (0.060) -0.185 (0.062)
Age61 -0.287 (0.042) -0.287 (0.042) -0.337 (0.030) -0.322 (0.033) -0.592 (0.105) -0.577 (0.125) -0.475 (0.059) -0.499 (0.048) -0.380 (0.084) -0.377 (0.085) -0.175 (0.069) -0.158 (0.077)
Age62 -0.345 (0.034) -0.340 (0.035) -0.345 (0.027) -0.331 (0.030) -0.581 (0.112) -0.573 (0.128) -0.532 (0.033) -0.532 (0.031) -0.366 (0.088) -0.359 (0.090) -0.108 (0.094) -0.083 (0.104)
Age63 -0.345 (0.031) -0.342 (0.031) -0.377 (0.021) -0.369 (0.021) -0.581 (0.113) -0.567 (0.130) -0.515 (0.034) -0.520 (0.030) -0.395 (0.082) -0.387 (0.085) -0.264 (0.040) -0.264 (0.039)
Age64 -0.380 (0.031) -0.375 (0.032) -0.610 (0.099) -0.579 (0.126) -0.526 (0.040) -0.535 (0.034) -0.536 (0.047) -0.535 (0.049) -0.281 (0.032) -0.275 (0.035)
Demographic variables
Secondary education 0.074 (0.057) 0.080 (0.058) 0.020 (0.045) 0.007 (0.046) 0.114 (0.064) 0.096 (0.065) -0.018 (0.064) -0.046 (0.067) 0.080 (0.061) 0.073 (0.061) -0.017 (0.047) -0.015 (0.047)
Higher education 0.317 (0.074) 0.317 (0.075) 0.214 (0.051) 0.190 (0.051) 0.311 (0.059) 0.298 (0.062) 0.135 (0.070) 0.124 (0.071) 0.178 (0.063) 0.168 (0.064) 0.231 (0.062) 0.227 (0.063)
Children -0.016 (0.028) -0.018 (0.028) -0.012 (0.023) -0.008 (0.023) 0.032 (0.063) 0.040 (0.069) -0.064 (0.027) -0.070 (0.028) -0.003 (0.028) 0.000 (0.028) -0.011 (0.021) -0.014 (0.021)
Couple -0.110 (0.054) -0.112 (0.054) -0.017 (0.048) -0.022 (0.048) 0.008 (0.059) 0.004 (0.060) -0.167 (0.059) -0.235 (0.061) -0.087 (0.053) -0.094 (0.054) -0.177 (0.049) -0.175 (0.049)
Health related variables
Self-reported health 0.116 (0.051) 0.119 (0.060) 0.166 (0.040) 0.108 (0.052) 0.285 (0.066) 0.155 (0.081) 0.130 (0.063) 0.058 (0.071) 0.150 (0.043) 0.111 (0.050) 0.128 (0.043) 0.131 (0.046)
Severe condition -0.087 (0.068) -0.060 (0.054) -0.143 (0.077) -0.292 (0.080) -0.043 (0.065) 0.096 (0.098)
Mild condition -0.018 (0.052) -0.038 (0.043) -0.007 (0.059) -0.049 (0.065) -0.053 (0.044) -0.065 (0.046)
(I)ADL 0.023 (0.054) -0.017 (0.044) -0.035 (0.062) 0.069 (0.063) -0.062 (0.044) 0.025 (0.043)
Obese 0.010 (0.063) -0.038 (0.050) 0.087 (0.072) -0.151 (0.075) 0.026 (0.058) 0.046 (0.052)
Grip strength 0.019 (0.026) 0.075 (0.022) 0.083 (0.030) 0.020 (0.031) -0.033 (0.021) 0.028 (0.022)
Bad mental health 0.086 (0.067) 0.014 (0.048) -0.145 (0.076) -0.154 (0.059) -0.011 (0.055) -0.015 (0.048)
Wald test statistic 2.5 17.0 16.3 20.9 6.2 6.4
Observations 475 735 434 427 776 552
Pseudo R squared 0.274 0.279 0.213 0.231 0.326 0.360 0.213 0.247 0.221 0.226 0.149 0.158
Table 10: Marginal effects women. Part 1
Note: Bold entries are significant at the five percent significance level
Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden Switzerland
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Specification 2
Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err. Marg. eff. St. err.
Age dummies
Age51 0.045 (0.097) 0.047 (0.098) 0.095 (0.107) 0.121 (0.110) -0.088 (0.097) -0.102 (0.096) 0.097 (0.068) 0.093 (0.064) -0.032 (0.186) -0.018 (0.187)
Age52 0.050 (0.101) 0.048 (0.101) 0.093 (0.106) 0.085 (0.109) -0.123 (0.089) -0.131 (0.088) -0.078 (0.106) -0.096 (0.110) -0.298 (0.185) -0.251 (0.194)
Age53 0.033 (0.098) 0.028 (0.098) -0.027 (0.095) 0.014 (0.100) -0.104 (0.091) -0.096 (0.093) 0.032 (0.083) 0.031 (0.084) -0.018 (0.164) -0.051 (0.175)
Age54 -0.061 (0.072) -0.060 (0.073) 0.029 (0.106) 0.036 (0.109) -0.159 (0.084) -0.169 (0.080) 0.030 (0.078) 0.017 (0.077) -0.111 (0.158) -0.095 (0.170)
Age55 -0.019 (0.082) -0.016 (0.085) -0.030 (0.101) 0.006 (0.104) -0.013 (0.105) -0.027 (0.107) -0.039 (0.097) -0.030 (0.093) 0.008 (0.217) -0.061 (0.243)
Age56 -0.154 (0.046) -0.148 (0.048) -0.040 (0.096) -0.003 (0.099) -0.213 (0.073) -0.210 (0.073) 0.057 (0.077) 0.050 (0.076) -0.267 (0.197) -0.303 (0.186)
Age57 -0.130 (0.053) -0.123 (0.056) 0.009 (0.098) 0.054 (0.102) -0.164 (0.085) -0.160 (0.086) 0.019 (0.082) 0.024 (0.078) -0.322 (0.186) -0.377 (0.194)
Age58 -0.108 (0.059) -0.105 (0.060) -0.140 (0.093) -0.124 (0.096) -0.106 (0.098) -0.104 (0.103) -0.079 (0.100) -0.072 (0.094) -0.362 (0.178) -0.283 (0.199)
Age59 -0.141 (0.051) -0.139 (0.051) -0.118 (0.099) -0.060 (0.107) -0.101 (0.095) -0.074 (0.103) -0.038 (0.088) -0.033 (0.085) -0.210 (0.174) -0.138 (0.184)
Age60 -0.235 (0.024) -0.230 (0.024) -0.347 (0.059) -0.331 (0.063) -0.137 (0.095) -0.125 (0.098) 0.024 (0.086) -0.003 (0.089) -0.418 (0.151) -0.353 (0.170)
Age61 -0.201 (0.031) -0.197 (0.032) -0.333 (0.063) -0.304 (0.070) -0.267 (0.061) -0.254 (0.065) -0.234 (0.107) -0.207 (0.105) -0.404 (0.176) -0.377 (0.190)
Age62 -0.221 (0.025) -0.216 (0.026) -0.288 (0.074) -0.259 (0.082) -0.338 (0.040) -0.329 (0.043) -0.106 (0.108) -0.109 (0.108) -0.362 (0.181) -0.218 (0.212)
Age63 -0.211 (0.027) -0.205 (0.029) -0.421 (0.037) -0.405 (0.042) -0.160 (0.095) -0.151 (0.098) -0.322 (0.121) -0.338 (0.119) -0.610 (0.120) -0.563 (0.158)
Age64 -0.227 (0.028) -0.223 (0.029) -0.356 (0.059) -0.327 (0.070) -0.332 (0.046) -0.328 (0.048) -0.399 (0.119) -0.387 (0.122) -0.602 (0.111) -0.543 (0.150)
Demographic variables
Secondary education 0.185 (0.046) 0.180 (0.047) 0.129 (0.048) 0.114 (0.048) 0.205 (0.070) 0.200 (0.071) 0.064 (0.035) 0.067 (0.034) 0.121 (0.068) 0.069 (0.076)
Higher education 0.457 (0.069) 0.456 (0.069) 0.305 (0.045) 0.286 (0.047) 0.353 (0.079) 0.321 (0.083) 0.100 (0.032) 0.100 (0.032) 0.189 (0.068) 0.195 (0.064)
Children -0.034 (0.016) -0.038 (0.016) 0.013 (0.025) 0.013 (0.026) 0.010 (0.018) 0.015 (0.019) 0.006 (0.030) 0.004 (0.030) -0.070 (0.033) -0.068 (0.033)
Couple -0.174 (0.055) -0.171 (0.055) -0.071 (0.057) -0.078 (0.058) -0.181 (0.059) -0.192 (0.060) 0.022 (0.043) 0.010 (0.041) 0.040 (0.073) 0.030 (0.074)
Health related variables
Self-reported health 0.107 (0.034) 0.077 (0.039) 0.184 (0.042) 0.078 (0.053) 0.171 (0.044) 0.146 (0.054) 0.266 (0.037) 0.137 (0.041) 0.040 (0.092) -0.039 (0.096)
Severe condition -0.037 (0.047) -0.089 (0.053) 0.147 (0.079) -0.066 (0.050) 0.146 (0.082)
Mild condition -0.050 (0.041) -0.055 (0.042) 0.016 (0.052) -0.026 (0.034) -0.071 (0.071)
(I)ADL 0.032 (0.038) -0.082 (0.042) -0.062 (0.053) -0.110 (0.035) -0.047 (0.082)
Obese -0.082 (0.041) -0.185 (0.046) -0.026 (0.051) 0.000 (0.041) 0.154 (0.080)
Grip strength 0.025 (0.021) 0.040 (0.019) 0.059 (0.026) 0.034 (0.016) 0.143 (0.045)
Bad mental health 0.007 (0.038) 0.024 (0.049) 0.029 (0.053) -0.117 (0.041) 0.102 (0.072)
Wald test statistic 7.3 32.7 9.8 33.0 21.0
Observations 688 835 559 794 238
Pseudo R squared 0.239 0.248 0.175 0.202 0.152 0.167 0.167 0.205 0.138 0.196
Table 11: Marginal effects women. Part 2
Note: Bold entries are significant at the five percent significance level